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Let me begin by thanking my critics for their contributions and for their willingness to engage in 
detail with my work in this forum. They do me a great honor. Let me also thank Ted Nannicelli 
for proposing both this symposium and the panel on my book at the 75th Anniversary ASA 
conference in New Orleans, November 2017, one of the events that preceded and led to this 
publication. The other events were the Aesthetics Today symposium, hosted by the Aesthetics 
Research Centre, at the University of Kent, 5-6 June 2017, and the Naturalized Aesthetics of 
Film workshop at the CUNY Graduate Center, 27 March 2018, for which my thanks to Joerg 
Fingerhut and Jesse Prinz. I have benefitted immeasurably from the feedback of speakers and 
audience members at all of these occasions, as I did from the BSA 2016 ゲ┞ﾏヮﾗゲｷ┌ﾏ さIs 
PsyIｴﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ‘WﾉW┗;ﾐデ デﾗ AWゲデｴWデｷIゲいざ devoted jointly to Film, Art, and the Third Culture and 
BWﾐIW N;ﾐ;┞げゲ Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception.1  
 
In expressing my gratitude to the participants at these occasions and to the contributors to this 
volume, I am not merely paying lip service to etiquette and tradition. Whatever contribution 
Film, Art, and the Third Culture (hereafter, FACT2) may make, its value is greatly amplified by the 
critical engagement of its readers, whether that engagement takes the form of endorsement, 
dissent, or something in between. Indeed the format of the author-meets-critics panel and the 
target article symposium embody the very methodology and central values that the book seeks 
to describe and defend に including openness to criticism, and the pursuit of knowledge as a 
collaborative activity. Whatever shortcomings FACT may exhibit in terms of its substantive 
arguments about film, spectatorship, emotion, and so on, if it helps to advance the cause of 
rational, critical dialogue within the humanities, and between the humanities and the sciences, 
it will have achieved something. 
 
OﾐW ﾗa デｴW IﾗﾐデヴｷH┌デﾗヴゲ ﾗﾐIW ゲ;ｷS デﾗ ﾏWぎ ｷa ┞ﾗ┌ ﾉﾗﾗﾆ IﾉﾗゲWﾉ┞ Wﾐﾗ┌ｪｴ ;デ ;ﾐ┞デｴｷﾐｪが ┞ﾗ┌げﾉﾉ aｷﾐS 
holes. FACT ｷゲ IWヴデ;ｷﾐﾉ┞ ﾐﾗ W┝IWヮデｷﾗﾐく Yﾗ┌ ヮヴﾗH;Hﾉ┞ Sﾗﾐげデ W┗Wﾐ ﾐWWS デﾗ W┝;ﾏｷﾐW ｷデ デｴ;デ IﾉﾗゲWﾉ┞ 
to see the problems. I cannot attend to all the many good criticisms raised by my critics に for 
that I would have needed an entire book, outreaching even the great generosity of the editor. 
B┌デ ｷﾐ ┘ｴ;デ aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘ゲが Iげ┗W デヴｷWS デﾗ ﾏ;ﾆW IﾗﾐﾐWIデｷﾗﾐゲ HWデ┘WWﾐ ;ﾐS ;ﾏﾗﾐｪ デｴWｷヴ IﾗﾏﾏWﾐデゲが ｷﾐ ;ﾐ 
attempt to figure out where the book fails, what it achieves, and where the conversation might 
turn next.  
 
Transparency, (liberated) embodied simuﾉ;デｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS デｴW けゲﾆｷﾐ-ゲIヴWWﾐげ 
Iﾐ ｴｷゲ IﾗﾏﾏWﾐデ;ヴ┞が Vｷデデﾗヴｷﾗ G;ﾉﾉWゲW ゲWデゲ ﾗ┌デ デｴW デｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa けWﾏHﾗSｷWS ゲｷﾏ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐげ ふE“ぶ デｴ;デ ｴW 
has developed and refined over many years. ES is a general theory of human social interaction に 
or an aspect thereof に but one which applies, ipso facto, to narrative film viewing. (More on this 
assumption later, when I turn to an objection from Kate Thomson-Jones.) Gallese writes: 
けEmbodied simulation describes, from a functional standpoint, the neural mechanisms that 
ensure the clarity of our connections with the world around us, forming a dialectical 
relationship between the body and the mind, between subject and object, you and me. The 
pivotal motor aspects of our bodily-self integrate and anchor to a bodily first-person 
perspective the multimodal sensory information about the body and about the world it 
inteヴ;Iデゲ ┘ｷデｴげ ふΓぶく3 Gallese argues that, in the context of film viewing, embodied simulation is 
けﾉｷHWヴ;デWSがげ ｷﾐ デｴW ゲWﾐゲW デｴ;デ ﾗ┌ヴ ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾏﾏﾗHｷﾉW ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ ┘ｴｷﾉW ┘;デIｴｷﾐｪ ; aｷﾉﾏ frees up our 
(embodied) cognitive capacity, allowing more of that capacity to be devoted to modelling 
imaginatively the experiences of the characters whose fates we follow. This seems to be in 
accord with the argument in FACT that film viewing may expand our ordinary empathic capacity 
けｷﾐ ゲIﾗヮW ;ﾐS ｷﾐデWﾐゲｷデ┞げ ふ┝┝-xx; an argument also noted by Stadler (7-8) in her contribution, and 
perfectly exemplified by Under the Skinが ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴﾉ┞ ｷﾐ ヴWゲヮWIデ ﾗa けゲIﾗヮWがげ ;ゲ LW┗ｷﾐゲﾗﾐ 
demonstrates, 8-9). What Gallese stresses here is the neural dimension of the explanation に in 
ﾏ┞ デWヴﾏゲが デｴW ﾐW┌ヴ;ﾉ けﾉWｪげ ﾗa デｴW デヴｷ;ﾐｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾏﾗSWﾉぎ ﾗ┌ヴ W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIW ﾗa ヮﾗ┘Wヴa┌ﾉ Wﾏヮ;デｴｷI 
experiences with a wide range of characters connects on the one hand with the psychological 
(and social) functions of empathy, and on the other with the neurophysiological mechanisms 
which enable it. The methodological claim here is that the theory is strengthened by virtue of 
the consilience across the phenomenological, psychological, and neurophysiological levels.  
 
Gallese pushes his application of ES to film spectatorship into new territory here by considering 
how embodied simulation might work in the context of viewing moving images on mobile 
devices. Given the explosive development and dissemination of new motion picture 
technologies, it is surely important to consider their impact on the psychology of viewing; FACT 
makes some gestures in this directiﾗﾐが デｴﾗ┌ｪｴ ｷﾐ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ デﾗ けｷﾏﾏWヴゲｷ┗Wげ ┗ｷW┘ｷﾐｪ デWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲが 
like virtual reality and 4D projection systems, rather than portable screens (chapter 2). Gallese 
argues that mobile devices make a significant difference to the operations of embodied 
simulation, by allowing us to control through touch the temporal flow of a movie. (And not only 
the temporal flow: some mobile devices also enable us to zoom into selected parts of the 
frame.) The screen of a tablet or smart phone thereby takes on a tactile presence, ; けゲﾆｷﾐげ デｴ;デ 
we stroke in order to stop, start, rewind, skip forward, and so forth.  
 
G;ﾉﾉWゲWげゲ ;ヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデ ;Hﾗ┌デ デｴｷゲ ﾐW┘ ┗ｷW┘ｷﾐｪ けヴWｪｷﾏWげ SWヮWﾐSゲが ｴﾗ┘W┗Wヴが ﾗﾐ ┘ｴ;デ I ヴWｪ;ヴS ;ゲ ; 
ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏ;デｷI H;Iﾆｪヴﾗ┌ﾐS ｷSW; ヴWｪ;ヴSｷﾐｪ けゲデ;ﾐS;ヴSげ aｷﾉﾏ ┗ｷW┘ｷﾐｪ に the idea that the latter is 
Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴｷ┣WS H┞ けデヴ;ﾐゲヮ;ヴWﾐI┞げ ふﾐﾗデW デｴ;デ DﾗﾏｷﾐｷI Tﾗヮヮ ;ﾉゲﾗ ﾏ;ﾆWゲ ヴWaWヴWﾐIW デﾗ デｴｷゲ ﾐﾗデｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ 
relation to my analysis of Heimat ふンぶが ;ﾉデｴﾗ┌ｪｴ I Sﾗﾐげデ ┌ゲW デｴW デWヴﾏ ﾏ┞ゲWﾉa ｷﾐ デｴ;デ IﾗﾐデW┝デぶく Oﾐ 
this view, the default mode of film perception is one in which we have little or no awareness of 
デｴW けIﾗﾐaｷｪ┌ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉげ ;ゲヮWIデ ﾗa ; aｷﾉﾏ に ｷデげゲ ゲ┌ヴa;IW ;ﾐS SWゲｷｪﾐ aW;デ┌ヴWゲく Tﾗ ┌ゲW デｴW デWヴﾏｷﾐﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ 
introduced by Richard Wollheim in his theory of still depiction, we see through the surface of a 
film to what it depicts, while we see the depicted contents of a painting in ｷデゲ ゲ┌ヴa;IWく ふIげﾉﾉ ヴWデ┌ヴﾐ 
デﾗ デｴW ｷSW; デｴ;デ ┘W I;ﾐ デ;ﾉﾆ ﾗa デｴW けゲ┌ヴa;IWげ ﾗa aｷﾉﾏ ﾉ;デWヴ ﾗﾐが ｷﾐ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ デﾗ JﾗWヴｪ FｷﾐｪWヴｴ┌デげゲ 
IﾗﾏﾏWﾐデ;ヴ┞くぶ “ﾗ aｷﾉﾏ ｷゲ けデヴ;ﾐゲヮ;ヴWﾐデげ ｷﾐ デｴW ゲWﾐゲW デｴ;デ ┘W ゲWW ゲデヴ;ｷｪht through it. This is a very 
longstanding idea in film theory, and one articulated, refined, and defended with exceptional 
care by George Wilson in recent years.4 
 
NﾗﾐWデｴWﾉWゲゲが ｷデげゲ ;デ HWゲデ ; ﾏｷゲﾉW;Sｷﾐｪ ｷSW;く TｴWヴW I;ﾐ HW ﾉｷデデﾉW Sﾗ┌Hデ デｴ;デ ┘;デIｴｷﾐｪ ; aｷﾉﾏ 
contrasts in many ways with looking at a painting に the presence of movement alone 
guarantees that much. But capturing that difference, and describing film viewing in terms of, 
transparency overlooks the extent to which we retain an awareness of the configurational 
dimensions of a film even as we perceive what it depicts: consider, for example, lens and film 
stock artefacts に lens flare, racked focus, visual distortions arising from wide or telephoto lens, 
visible grain or pixilation, and colour grading. Far from being marginal, exceptional qualities of 
the look of a film, these features are absolutely standard. 
 
“ﾗ ｴﾗ┘ SﾗWゲ デｴｷゲ ｴ;┗W ; HW;ヴｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ G;ﾉﾉWゲWげゲ ヮヴﾗヮﾗゲ;ﾉい TｴWヴW ;ヴW デ┘ﾗ ヮﾗｷﾐデゲ デﾗ IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴ ｴWヴWく 
The first is that, once the transparency thesis is cut back, the contrast between film viewing 
┌ﾐSWヴ デヴ;Sｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS ｷﾐ デｴW ﾐW┘ ﾏﾗHｷﾉW ﾉ;ﾐSゲI;ヮW ｷゲ SｷﾏｷﾐｷゲｴWSく Tｴ;デげゲ ﾐﾗデ デﾗ SWﾐ┞ 
that mobile viewing is different in many ways; but the contrast is not primarily a matter of 
transparency. Mobile film viewers are perfectly capable of becoming absorbed in a film, just as 
much as a traditional film or tv viewer; witness train passengers glued to their screens during 
ヴ┌ゲｴ ｴﾗ┌ヴく Tﾗ┌IｴゲIヴWWﾐゲ ;ヴW ; ヴWﾉ;デｷ┗Wﾉ┞ ﾐW┘ ヮｴWﾐﾗﾏWﾐﾗﾐが ｷデげゲ デヴ┌Wが H┌デ ヮ;┌ゲｷﾐｪ ﾉｷ┗W デ┗ ﾗr 
playback on a dvd, and leaving the auditorium to visit the bathroom in a traditional cinema are 
WﾐデｷヴWﾉ┞ a;ﾏｷﾉｷ;ヴ ヮヴ;IデｷIWゲく Wｴ;デげゲ Iﾗﾏﾏﾗﾐ デﾗ デｴW ﾗﾉS ;ﾐS デｴW ﾐW┘ デWIｴﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲ ｷゲ デｴW a;Iデ デｴ;デ 
we sometimes need to suspend our engagement with a film: life intervenes, whether in the 
form of bladder pressure, the baby crying upstairs, or the ticket inspector. 
 
“ﾗが デｴW ゲIヴWWﾐ ﾗa ; ﾏﾗHｷﾉW SW┗ｷIW I;ﾐげデ IW;ゲW デﾗ HW デヴ;ﾐゲヮ;ヴWﾐデ ふヱヶぶ HWI;┌ゲW ｷデ ┘;ゲﾐげデ 
transparent in the first place. What of the second issue? Gallese suggests that the literal tactility 
ｷﾐデヴﾗS┌IWS ｷﾐデﾗ ﾗ┌ヴ W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIW H┞ ﾏﾗHｷﾉW ゲIヴWWﾐゲ けSﾗ┌HﾉWゲ デｴW デ;Iデｷﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐげ ふヱヶぶ H┞ 
compounding the haptic, tactile dimension of film perception already in play by virtue of 
embodied simulation. That is surely right, but it is important to note that these are two parallel, 
ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ ｷﾐデWｪヴ;デWSが aﾗヴﾏゲ ﾗa けデ;IデｷﾉW ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐくげ WｴWﾐ ┘W デﾗ┌Iｴ デｴW ゲIヴWWﾐ デﾗ ﾏ;ﾐｷヮ┌ﾉ;デW デｴW 
passage of the film, the divide between the depicted, diegetic space, and the real space we 
inhabit, is, if anything, underlined; it is certainly no less apparent to us than in a traditional 
screening setting. In the case of virtual reality environments, by contrast, our actual and 
simulated embodied experiences come into close に ideally, fully unified に alignment.  
 
Aesthetic experience 
Iﾐ デｴW Iﾗ┌ヴゲW ﾗa ﾉ;┞ｷﾐｪ ﾗ┌デ ｴｷゲ ;ヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデゲ ﾗﾐ WﾏHﾗSｷWS ゲｷﾏ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS デｴW けゲヮWIｷ;ﾉ IﾗﾐデW┝デげ ﾗa 
film spectatorship, Gallese in effect invokes one traditional conception of aesthetic experience 
に a;ﾏﾗ┌ゲﾉ┞ I;ゲデ ｷﾐ デWヴﾏゲ ﾗa けPゲ┞IｴｷI;ﾉ Dｷゲデ;ﾐIWげ H┞ ES┘;ヴS B┌ﾉﾉﾗ┌ｪｴが ┘ｴｷIｴ けｴ;ゲ ; negative, 
inhibitory aspect に the cutting-out of the practical sides of things and of our practical attitude to 
them に and a positive side に the elaboration of the experience on the new basis created by the 
ｷﾐｴｷHｷデﾗヴ┞ ;Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa Dｷゲデ;ﾐIWくげ5 Iﾐ ; ゲｷﾏｷﾉ;ヴ ┗Wｷﾐが WゲヮWIｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾐ ヴWゲヮWIデ ﾗa デｴW ﾉ;デデWヴ けヮﾗゲｷデｷ┗W ゲｷSWげ 
ﾗa ゲ┌Iｴ けDｷゲデ;ﾐIWがげ G;ﾉﾉWゲW ;ヴｪ┌Wゲ デｴ;デ ;デデWﾐデｷﾗﾐ デﾗ ; aｷIデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ┘ﾗヴﾉS ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗Wゲ ; ヮゲ┞IｴﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ 
けSｷゲデ;ﾐIｷﾐｪ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW ┌ﾐヴWﾉ;デWS W┝デWヴﾐ;ﾉ ┘ﾗヴﾉSぐぷ;へ デWmporary suspension of the active grip on 
ﾗ┌ヴ S;ｷﾉ┞ ﾗII┌ヮ;デｷﾗﾐゲが ぷ┘ｴｷIｴへ ﾉｷHWヴ;デWゲ ﾐW┘ ゲｷﾏ┌ﾉ;デｷ┗W WﾐWヴｪｷWゲげ ふヱンぶく TｴW ﾉｷﾐﾆ ｷﾐ G;ﾉﾉWゲWげゲ 
デｴWﾗヴ┞ HWデ┘WWﾐ デｴｷゲ IﾗﾐIWヮデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS けﾉｷHWヴ;デWS WﾏHﾗSｷWS ゲｷﾏ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐげ ｷゲ デｴ┌ゲ IﾉW;ヴく  
 
The topic of aesthetic experience briﾐｪゲ ┌ゲ デﾗ P;ｷゲﾉW┞ Lｷ┗ｷﾐｪゲデﾗﾐげゲ IﾗﾏﾏWﾐデ;ヴ┞く Lｷ┗ｷﾐｪゲデﾗﾐ 
デW;ゲWゲ ﾗ┌デ デｴW aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ ﾐWIWゲゲ;ヴ┞ IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗﾐ ;WゲデｴWデｷI W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIW aヴﾗﾏ FACTぎ けふAEぶ Ia ;ﾐ 
experience is aesthetic, it is self-conscious due to extraordinary perceptual, affective, or 
cognitive functioﾐｷﾐｪげ ふヲぶく Aｪ;ｷﾐゲデ デｴｷゲ IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐが Lｷ┗ｷﾐｪゲデﾗﾐ SｷヴWIデゲ デ┘ﾗ Iﾗ┌ﾐデWヴW┝;ﾏヮﾉWゲぎ 
unreflective aesthetic responses, that is, those lacking the second-ﾗヴSWヴ けゲ;┗ﾗ┌ヴｷﾐｪげ デｴ;デ I Iﾉ;ｷﾏ 
is important to aesthetic experience; and Castelveltro cases, that is, those lackiﾐｪ ;ﾐ┞ けゲデヴWゲゲｷﾐｪげ 
of our ordinary cognitive capacities. Here I put my hands up! AE surely is too demanding a 
condition to capture the entire range of aesthetic experiences. Livingston generously recasts 
the proposal as a necessary condition on the kind of aesthetic experience generally sought by 
proponents of modernism, but then still wonders on what grounds that デ┞ヮW ﾗa けW┝;ﾉデWSげ 
aesthetic experience could be judged to be superior to his counterexample types of aesthetic 
experience. And, while endorsing the suggestion in FACT that being aesthetic is a matter of 
degree (6), he casts doubt on whether self-consciousness is the right scalar property, instead 
a;┗ﾗ┌ヴｷﾐｪ デｴW ヮヴﾗヮﾗゲ;ﾉ デｴ;デ デｴW ふﾗヴ ;デ ﾉW;ゲデ ;ﾐぶ けWゲゲWﾐデｷ;ﾉ ゲI;ﾉ;ヴ a;Iデﾗヴ ｷﾐ ;WゲデｴWデｷI W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIW ｷゲ 
the relative Wﾏヮｴ;ゲｷゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW ﾗHﾃWIデげゲ inherent value, where this is understood to occasion 
IﾗﾐデWﾏヮﾉ;デｷ┗W W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIWゲ ｴ;┗ｷﾐｪ ;ﾐ ｷﾐデヴｷﾐゲｷI ┗;ﾉ┌Wげ ふΑぶく  
 
Lｷ┗ｷﾐｪゲデﾗﾐげゲ ヮﾗゲｷデｷ┗W ヮヴﾗヮﾗゲ;ﾉゲ IWヴデ;ｷﾐﾉ┞ SWゲWヴ┗W ; a┌ﾉﾉ ｴW;ヴｷﾐｪく B┌デ ｴWヴW I ┘ｷﾉﾉ ゲ;┞ ; aW┘ デｴｷﾐｪゲ ｷﾐ 
defence of a more moderate version of AE. One thing to say here is that self-consciousness 
might be thought of as neither necessary, nor sufficient, for aesthetic experience に but 
nevertheless typical of it, or at least the subtype of aesthetic experience prompted by art in 
general and modernist art in particular. Nor need we value reflexive episodes of aesthetic 
experience more highly than unself-conscious instances, even while holding that, as a matter of 
fact, aesthetic experiences vary along this dimension. For we face the following difficulty. On 
the one hand, not only do there seem to be unreflective aesthetic responses, but self-
IﾗﾐゲIｷﾗ┌ゲﾐWゲゲ けｷゲ ｷﾐｷﾏｷI;ﾉ デﾗ ゲﾗﾏW ﾆｷﾐSゲ ﾗa aｷヴゲデ-order aesthetic experiences, such as an 
experience of un-self-conscious immediaI┞が ゲヮﾗﾐデ;ﾐWｷデ┞げ ふンぶが ;ゲ ┘Wﾉﾉ ;ゲが Lｷ┗ｷﾐｪゲデﾗﾐ ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデゲが デｴW 
fluent-processing typically afforded by mainstream narrative films. On the other hand, it is not 
as if the second-ﾗヴSWヴ けゲ;┗ﾗ┌ヴｷﾐｪげ ;ﾐ ;WゲデｴWデｷI W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIW ｷゲ ; ヴ;ヴW ﾗヴ ﾗHゲI┌ヴW ヮｴWﾐﾗﾏWﾐﾗﾐく  
 
With this in mind, another way forward suggests itself: it might be that self-consciousness is a 
necessary condition of aesthetic appreciation に where such appreciation is demarcated from 
aesthetic experience precisely by virtue of the reflexive dimension whereby we recognize the 
value of the experience as we have it.6 The value or the disvalue, I should say: Livingston is right 
to note that, while the rhetorical accent in FACT falls on cases of positive aesthetic value に the 
┘ﾗヴS けゲ;┗ﾗ┌ヴｷﾐｪげ ヮﾗｷﾐデゲ Wﾏヮｴ;デｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ in that direction に the theory presented in FACT is 
perfectly compatible with negative aesthetic experiences, and with self-consciously registered 
negative experiences to boot.7 Interestingly, however, there seem to be few words in English 
which give expression to a negative aesthetic experience in second-order terms に けSｷゲﾉｷﾆWがげ 
けSｷゲｪ┌ゲデがげ け┌ﾐヮﾉW;ゲ;ﾐデげ ;ﾉﾉ ﾗヮWヴ;デｷﾐｪ ;デ デｴW aｷヴゲデ-order level に but I think we can all recognize 
┘ｴ;デ ｷデ ｷゲ デﾗ け┌ﾐゲ;┗ﾗ┌ヴげ ;ﾐ W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIWぎ ﾗﾐW ヴWaﾉWIデゲ ﾗﾐ ﾃ┌ゲデ ｴﾗ┘ H;S ｷデ ｷゲく 
 
A third point concerns what sort of affective, cognitive, or perceptual activity counts as 
extraordinary, or at least pushing normal function. Livingston claims that the auditor listening 
to a composition by Satie is not having her perceptual or cognitive capacities in any way 
stretched. This claim is debateable. Arguably, the kind of auditory perception at play in listening 
デﾗ ﾏ┌ゲｷI ｷﾐ ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉ ｷゲ ;ﾉヴW;S┞ Sｷ┗ﾗヴIWS aヴﾗﾏ ﾗヴSｷﾐ;ヴ┞ ヮWヴIWヮデ┌;ﾉ a┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐゲぎ ┘WげヴW ﾐﾗデ ﾉｷゲデWﾐｷﾐｪ 
to it to discover anything about the world around us, but for its own sake. If one thinks of the 
arts as an outgrowth of our aesthetic capacities, then music is perhaps the clearest example of 
an artform which has developed through and as a specialized exaptation of a more basic 
cognitive capacity.8 ふI ヮヴﾗヮﾗゲW ゲﾗﾏWデｴｷﾐｪ ゲｷﾏｷﾉ;ヴ ┘ｷデｴ ヴWゲヮWIデ デﾗ SWヮｷIデｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ FACTぎ けAヴｪ┌;Hﾉ┞が 
seeing-in ｷデゲWﾉa ｷゲ デｴW H;ゲｷI aﾗヴﾏ ﾗa W┝ヮ;ﾐゲｷﾗﾐ ｴWヴWげ ふヴヲぶく MﾗヴW ﾗﾐ デｴｷゲ ｷSW; HWﾉﾗ┘くぶ Iﾐ デｴｷゲ ゲWﾐゲWが 
デｴW デｴヴWゲｴﾗﾉS aﾗヴ けW┝デヴ;-ﾐﾗヴﾏ;ﾉげ ヮWヴIWヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗヴ Iﾗｪﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾏ;┞ HW ﾏ┌Iｴ ﾉﾗ┘Wr than Livingston 
デ;ﾆWゲ ｷデ デﾗ HWく B┌デ HW┞ﾗﾐS デｴｷゲ ﾗHゲWヴ┗;デｷﾗﾐ ;Hﾗ┌デ ﾏ┌ゲｷI ｷﾐ ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉぎ ｷデげゲ デヴ┌W デｴ;デ “;デｷWげゲ 
Gnossienne No. 2, like the rest of his gnossienne compositions and much of his other work, is a 
ﾏｷﾐｷﾏ;ﾉが ;デﾏﾗゲヮｴWヴｷI ヮｷWIW ┘ｴｷIｴ SﾗWゲﾐげデ ゲデヴ;ｷﾐ ﾗ┌ヴ pitch perception, or other parameters of 
auditory perception, is neither here nor there. But in cognitive デWヴﾏゲが “;デｷWげゲ Iﾗﾏヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ does 
put some pressure on our musical cognition: what is this strange, spare, calm but eerie music? 
What sort of unusual formal, harmonic, and rhythmic principles does it embody? The fact that 
“;デｷW ｷﾐ┗WﾐデWS デｴW ┘ﾗヴS けｪﾐﾗゲゲｷWﾐﾐWげ aﾗヴ デｴWゲW Iﾗﾏヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐゲ ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデゲ デｴ;デ ｴW ┘;ゲ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐWS デﾗ 




Another motif that Gallese weaves into his account of embodied simulation in the context of 
film viewing is the analogy with dreaming, and relatedly to vision in early development, when 
our motor skills and autonomy are limiデWSく HW ┘ヴｷデWゲぎ けPWヴｴ;ヮゲ ｷデ ｷゲ ﾐﾗ IﾗｷﾐIｷSWﾐIW デｴ;デ ゲﾗﾏW ﾗa 
the most vivid fictional experiences we entertain, as those occurring through dreams, are 
ヮ;ヴ;ﾉﾉWﾉWS H┞ ﾏ;ゲゲｷ┗W ｷﾐｴｷHｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ﾏ┌ゲIﾉW デﾗﾐW ｷﾐ ﾗ┌ヴ HﾗS┞げ ふヱヴぶく JWヴヴﾗﾉS LW┗ｷﾐゲﾗﾐ ヮｷIﾆゲ ┌ヮ 
on a passaｪW ｷﾐ FACT ┘ｴｷIｴ ;ﾉﾉ┌SWゲ デﾗ SヴW;ﾏｷﾐｪが ﾐﾗデｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ I ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデ デｴ;デ けヮWヴｴ;ヮゲ all films 
offer us a distinct kind of immersive experience, one that contrasts with both ordinary 
perceptual experience and perceptual experience in dreams, being somewhat intermediate 
HWデ┘WWﾐ デｴW デ┘ﾗげ ふΒぶく Fヴﾗﾏ ﾏ┞ ヮWヴゲヮWIデｷ┗Wが デｴWゲW ;ヴW デ┘ﾗ ケ┌ｷデW SｷaaWヴWﾐデ ｴ┞ヮﾗデｴWゲWゲく TｴW ヴﾗﾉW 
of the dream comparison in my argument is limited to the point that, just as we accept that 
dreaming is a distinctive form of conscious cognition に distinct from waking cognition in its 
experiential character, psychological functions, and neural underpinning に so we should not 
rule out the possibility that film viewing might similarly constitute a distinctive type of 
conscious cognition. (And yes, I do insist that dreaming is a form of conscious cognition に just in 
the sense that dreams are experienced, and sometimes remembered. The epistemic 
deficiencies of dreaming as a guide to our actual state does not compromise its status as a form 
of conscious cognition.) I do not even go quite as far as Levinson suggests when he writes that 
aｷﾉﾏ ヮWヴIWヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾏ;┞ HW けゲﾗﾏW┘ｴ;デ ｷﾐデWヴﾏWSｷ;デWげ HWデ┘WWﾐ ﾗヴSｷﾐ;ヴ┞ ヮWヴIWヮデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ヮWヴIWヮデ┌;ﾉ 
experience in dreams.  
 
G;ﾉﾉWゲWげゲ ;ﾐ;ﾉﾗｪ┞ HWデ┘WWﾐ SヴW;ﾏｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS aｷﾉﾏ ヮWヴIWヮデｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ ﾏ┌Iｴ ﾏﾗヴW Sｷヴect: watching a film 
and having a dream are alike in that in both contexts, our bodies become immobile as our 
minds represent vivid scenarios. But the inhibition of movement in the context of dreaming is 
quite different to that which accompanies film viewing: the literal, if temporary, paralysis of 
REM sleep is quite different to the voluntary (and never quite complete) stillness of film 
ゲヮWIデ;デﾗヴゲｴｷヮく Mﾗ┗ｷW ┗ｷW┘ｷﾐｪ ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗Wゲ Hﾗデｴ けﾏｷIヴﾗ-ﾏﾗ┗WﾏWﾐデゲげ ふゲｴ┌aaﾉｷﾐｪが aｷSｪWデｷﾐｪが ゲｴｷaデｷﾐｪが 
W;デｷﾐｪが Sヴｷﾐﾆｷﾐｪぶ ;ﾐS けﾏ;Iヴo-ﾏﾗ┗WﾏWﾐデゲげ ふデｴﾗゲW デヴｷヮゲ デﾗ デｴW H;デｴヴﾗﾗﾏぶく Iデ ;ﾉゲﾗ ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗Wゲ ; ﾉﾗデ ﾗa 
social interaction に ; SｷﾏWﾐゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa aｷﾉﾏ ┗ｷW┘ｷﾐｪ W┝ヮﾉﾗヴWS ｷﾐ J┌ﾉｷ;ﾐ H;ﾐｷIｴげゲ ヴWIWﾐデ Hﾗﾗﾆく9 All of 
these factors are disanalogous with dreaming. This is not to say that there is nothing to 
G;ﾉﾉWゲWげゲ ;ヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデ デｴ;デ aﾗI┌ゲゲWS ;デデWﾐデｷﾗﾐ ﾗﾐ ; ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデWS Wﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデ IﾗﾏHｷﾐWS ┘ｷデｴ 
ヴWS┌IWS ﾏﾗデﾗヴ ｷﾐデWヴ;Iデｷﾗﾐ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ヴW;ﾉ Wﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデ Wﾐ;HﾉWゲ デｴW けﾉｷHWヴ;デｷﾗﾐげ ;ﾐS デｴW 
ヴWSｷヴWIデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ヴWゲﾗ┌ヴIWゲ ﾗa デｴW けHヴ;ｷﾐ-body-ﾏｷﾐSげ デﾗ┘;ヴSゲ WﾏHﾗSｷWS ゲｷﾏ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐく But it is to 
resist the historically longstanding and evidently very tempting, but ultimately misleading, 
;ﾐ;ﾉﾗｪ┞ HWデ┘WWﾐ aｷﾉﾏ ;ﾐS SヴW;ﾏく LW┗ｷﾐゲﾗﾐげゲ ﾏﾗヴW ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴWS aﾗヴﾏ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ ;Hﾗ┌デ ;ゲ a;ヴ ;ゲ ｷデ ｷゲ 
plausible to go in this direction. 
 
Expansionism, cognition, and culture 
JﾗWヴｪ FｷﾐｪWヴｴ┌デげゲ IﾗﾏﾏWﾐデ;ヴ┞ Hヴｷﾐｪゲ デﾗｪWデｴWヴ デ┘ﾗ デﾗヮｷIゲ ;ﾉヴW;S┞ デﾗ┌IｴWS ┌ヮﾗﾐぎ WﾏHﾗSｷWS 
simulation, and seeing-in. Fingerhut sees an opportunity to extend the work done by embodied 
simulation in my account of film experience in general, and in particular in the case of the 
sequence from Strangers on a Train which features in chapter 7, by showing how it applies not 
only to the actions, emotions, and sensations of the characters depicted by a film, but also to 
デｴW ;ヴデｷゲデげゲ ;Iデｷﾗﾐゲ ;ゲ デｴW┞ ;ヴW W┗ｷSWﾐデ ｷﾐ デｴW Sepiction itself. In the case of a painting, the traces 
of those actions might include brushstrokes on the canvas; in the case of a film, the movement 
of the camera through space. In each case, these movements will possess expressive qualities に 
they will be fast or slow, abrupt or gradual, controlled or erratic, for example. Fingerhut refers 
to studies which show that, among types of camera movement, the steady-cam shot is the 
ﾏﾗゲデ ;ヮデ デﾗ デヴｷｪｪWヴ けﾏﾗデﾗヴ ヴWゲﾗﾐ;ﾐIWげ ふΑぶ ｷﾐ ┗ｷW┘Wヴゲく CﾗﾐゲｷSWヴｷﾐｪ デｴｷゲ aｷﾐSｷﾐｪ ｷﾐ relation to 
Strangers, Fingerhut pinpoints the moment when, struggling to retrieve the lighter, Bruno tips it 
down a further level in the drain. This moment is rendered visually through a downward pan 
and a slight track back and away from the lighter に a fluid movement comparable to that of a 
steady-cam shot (though of course the film long precedes the invention of the steady-cam). 
FｷﾐｪWヴｴ┌デ ｴ┞ヮﾗデｴWゲｷ┣Wゲ デｴ;デが ┗ｷ; ﾏﾗデﾗヴ ヴWゲﾗﾐ;ﾐIWが デｴW ゲｴﾗデ IヴW;デWゲ け;ﾐ W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIW ﾗa ヮｴ┞ゲｷI;ﾉ 
distancing [from] the object of SWゲｷヴW aﾗヴ Bヴ┌ﾐﾗがげ ｷﾐデWﾐゲｷa┞ｷﾐｪ ﾗ┌ヴ けW┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIW ﾗa ぷｴｷゲへ ﾉﾗゲゲ ;ﾐS 
Sｷゲ;ヮヮﾗｷﾐデﾏWﾐデげ ふヱヰぶく 
 
This strikes me as a persuasive and desirable extension of the role of embodied simulation in 
my general account of empathy in film, and an enrichment of my analysis of Strangers. But 
Fingerhut has his eye on bigger game beyond this sequence, or even the application of ES to 
I;ﾏWヴ; ﾏﾗ┗WﾏWﾐデ ｷﾐ ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉく FｷﾐｪWヴｴ┌デ ┘ﾗヴヴｷWゲ デｴ;デ デｴW ﾐﾗデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa けW┝ヮ;ﾐゲｷﾗﾐｷゲﾏげ に けデｴW 
pushing or pulling of ordinary perception and cognition out their comfort zones and customary 
a┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐｷﾐｪげ ふFACTが Αぶ に is made to do too much work in FACT, at least without further 
elaboration; and relatedly, he is concerned that I underestimate the extent to which human 
Iﾗｪﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ Hﾗ┌ﾐS ┌ヮ ┘ｷデｴ けﾗ┌ヴ ｷﾐデWヴ;Iデｷﾗﾐ ┘ｷデｴ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ;ヴデWa;Iデゲげ ふヲぶが ヮ┌デデｷﾐｪ デﾗﾗ ﾏ┌Iｴ ┘Wｷｪｴデ 
ﾗﾐ けデｴW HｷﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ H;ゲｷゲ ﾗa ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ I;ヮ;IｷデｷWゲげ ふヱぶが ﾐ;ヴヴﾗ┘ﾉ┞-conceived (a worry shared by Topp, 
┘ｴﾗ ┌ヴｪWゲ ﾏW デﾗ ヮ┌デ ﾏﾗヴW I┌ﾉデ┌ヴW ｷﾐ デｴW けHｷﾗI┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏげ I ;S┗ﾗI;デWぶく TｴWゲW SWaｷIｷWﾐIｷWゲ ;ヴW 
connected in that, Fingerhut holds, my pallid and undernourished account of expansionism 
might be cured by a fuller recognition of the cultural dimension of human cognition. How does 
this work? 
 
Fingerhut notes that expansionism is first introduced in FACT in relation to seeing-in, as the 
けH;ゲｷI aﾗヴﾏ ﾗa W┝ヮ;ﾐゲｷﾗﾐげ ふヴヲぶが HWaﾗヴW ヴWデ┌ヴﾐｷﾐｪ ｷﾐ Iｴ;ヮデWヴ Α ｷﾐ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ デﾗ Wﾏヮ;デｴ┞く B┌デ 
Fingerhut complains that while the expansion of our basic empathic capacities through the 
cultural practices and technologies of representation is worked out in some detail, the 
theorization of expansion at the more basic level is only sketched. Fingerhut addresses this lack 
H┞ Hヴｷﾐｪｷﾐｪ ｷﾐ ﾏﾗヴW SWデ;ｷﾉ aヴﾗﾏ WﾗﾉﾉｴWｷﾏげゲ デｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa ゲWWｷﾐｪ-in に already present in my account 
に and developing it through ES. Fingerhut emphasizes the importance of twofoldness in 
WﾗﾉﾉｴWｷﾏげゲ デｴWﾗヴ┞ぎ デｴW ｷSW; デｴ;デ ﾗ┌ヴ ヮWヴIWヮデ┌;ﾉ W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIW ﾗa ; SWヮｷIデｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗Wゲ ; 
ゲｷﾏ┌ﾉデ;ﾐWﾗ┌ゲ ;┘;ヴW ﾗa ｷデゲ けIﾗﾐaｷｪ┌ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉげ ふゲ┌ヴa;IW ;ﾐS SWゲｷｪﾐぶ ;ﾐS けヴWIﾗｪﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉげ properties 
(the space and figures it represents). While Gallese and Freedman have shown how embodied 
simulation may shed light on our experience of the configurational fold of paintings and 
sculptures, Fingerhut extends this argument to moving depiction. The ubiquity of filmic 
ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデ;デｷﾗﾐ Wﾐゲ┌ヴWゲ デｴ;デ ┘W ﾉW;ヴﾐ ; けaｷﾉﾏｷI HﾗS┞ ゲIｴWﾏ;がげ デｴ;デ ｷゲが ; ゲWデ ﾗa けゲWﾐゲﾗヴｷﾏﾗデﾗヴ 
ヴ┌ﾉWゲげ ふヴぶ に bearing on editing, camera movement, and presumably other aspects of film style - 
which allow us to grasp and respond appropriately to filmic representations. These rules or 
けWﾏHﾗSｷWS ヮWヴIWヮデ┌;ﾉ ゲﾆｷﾉﾉゲげ ふヱヱぶ ;ヴW ﾗﾐWゲ デｴ;デ ┘W ﾉW;ヴﾐ ふンぶが ヮヴWゲ┌ﾏ;Hﾉ┞ ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;ﾉﾉ┞が ;ﾐS ;ヴW ｷﾐ 
that sense cultural; at the same time, these rules augment our more basic perceptual 
capacities.  
 
Iげﾏ ｷﾐ ゲ┞ﾏヮ;デｴ┞ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW けデｴｷIﾆWﾐｷﾐｪげ ﾗa ﾏ┞ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデ ﾗa aｷﾉﾏｷI ゲWWｷﾐｪ-in that Fingerhut proposes 
here. Indeed an emphasis on the ways in which the arts, and cultural practices more generally, 
may amplify our ordinary cognitive capacities is central to chapter 7, the case being made there 
┗ｷ; Wﾐｪ;ｪWﾏWﾐデ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW デｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa デｴW けW┝デWﾐSWS ﾏｷﾐSがげ ;ゲ ┘Wﾉﾉ ;ゲ デｴW ｷSW; ﾗa けﾐｷIｴW 
Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾗﾐげ Sヴ;┘ﾐ aヴﾗﾏ W┗ﾗﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ヴ┞ デｴWﾗヴ┞く Tｴｷゲ けデWIｴﾐﾗ-I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉげ SｷﾏWﾐゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ﾗ┗Wヴ;ﾉﾉ 
theory advanced by FACT is noted by Jane Stadler in her commentary (1); though it is fair to 
argue, as Fingerhut does, that the force of this dimension is not felt equally across every part of 
デｴW デｴWﾗヴ┞く B┌デ I ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ﾐﾗデW デ┘ﾗ I;┗W;デゲ ｷﾐ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ デﾗ FｷﾐｪWヴｴ┌デげゲ ヮﾗゲｷデｷ┗W Iﾉ;ｷﾏゲく Fｷヴゲデが ┘ｴｷﾉW 
FｷﾐｪWヴｴ┌デ ;ヴｪ┌Wゲ デｴ;デ けゲヮWIデ;デﾗヴゲ Sﾗ ヮｷIﾆ ┌ヮ ﾗﾐ デｴW デ┘ﾗ aﾗﾉSゲげ ﾗa aｷﾉﾏｷI SWヮｷIデｷﾗﾐ ふヱヱぶが ｷﾐ ｴｷゲ 
analysis of Strangers, the motor resonance generated by camera movement that he identifies 
appears to be channelled straight back into the recognitional level. Rather than working to 
make salient the configurational fold, the movements intensify our empathic understanding or 
けﾏｷﾐSaWWﾉｷﾐｪげ ﾗa G┌┞ ;ﾐS Bヴ┌ﾐﾗ ふFACTが ヱΓヴき “デ;SﾉWヴ ﾐﾗデWゲ ﾏｷﾐSaWWﾉｷﾐｪが ヵぶく Tﾗ デｴｷゲ W┝デWﾐデが デｴW 
example looks like a more limited addition to the analysis of the sequence I offer, adding 
attention to camera movement alongside the facial and bodily expression and framing that I 
emphasize, but retaining a focus on character (the recognitional fold) rather than the means of 
depiction (the configurational fold). Thus more work would need to be done to show how 
embodied simulation works to make the configurational fold salient in our experience, as part 
of its twofoldness. 
 
M┞ ゲWIﾗﾐS I;┗W;デ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐゲ FｷﾐｪWヴｴ┌デげゲ SｷゲデｷﾐIデｷﾗﾐ HWデ┘WWﾐ W┝ヮ;ﾐゲｷﾗﾐｷゲﾏ ふヰぶ ;ﾐS W┝ヮ;ﾐゲｷﾗﾐｷゲﾏ 
ふヱぶく Iげﾏ ﾐﾗt sure I see the need to make a distinction between two sharply-distinguished levels 
here, or the reasoning behind making such a distinction; I am more inclined to think of 
expansion as something that comes in degrees. I wonder if I detect the influence in FｷﾐｪWヴｴ┌デげゲ 
argument here of Alva Noëげゲ デｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa デｴW ;ヴデゲが ヴWaWヴWﾐIWS H┞ FｷﾐｪWヴｴ┌デ ｷﾐ ; aﾗﾗデﾐﾗデWが ┘ｴｷIｴ 
makes a distinction between the ordinary operation of depiction, and the more self-conscious 
ヮヴ;IデｷIW ﾗa ヮ┌デデｷﾐｪ ゲ┌Iｴ デﾗﾗﾉゲ けﾗﾐ Sｷゲヮﾉ;┞げ ふﾐﾗデW ヱぶく Aゲ in the parallel case of aesthetic 
W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIWが SｷゲI┌ゲゲWS ;Hﾗ┗W ｷﾐ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ デﾗ Lｷ┗ｷﾐｪゲデﾗﾐげゲ IﾗﾏﾏWﾐデ;ヴ┞が ｷデ ｷゲ ﾏﾗヴW ヮﾉ;┌ゲｷHﾉW デﾗ デｴｷﾐﾆ 
in terms of a continuum of cases and possibilities, ranging from the most functional uses of still 
or moving depiction (your wedding video) to the most elaborately reflexive (The Man With a 
Movie Camera). Otherwise, we run the risk of developing a rather parochial theory, only 
covering or skewed towards the kind of reflexive artistic practice typical of modernism (a risk 
that, as we have seen, my own account of aesthetic experience runs).10   
 
MWﾐデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ﾏﾗSWヴﾐｷゲﾏ Hヴｷﾐｪゲ ﾏW デﾗ DﾗﾏｷﾐｷI Tﾗヮヮげゲ IﾗﾏﾏWﾐデ;ヴ┞く Tﾗヮヮが ﾉｷﾆW FｷﾐｪWヴｴ┌デが ┘;ﾐデゲ 
デﾗ ヮ┌デ ふﾏﾗヴWぶ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴW ｷﾐデﾗ HｷﾗI┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏく FｷﾐｪWヴｴ┌デ ;ﾉﾉ┌SWゲ デﾗ ﾏﾗSWヴﾐｷゲデ ;ヴデｷゲデｷI ヮヴ;IデｷIWゲ ふけﾗ┌ヴ 
mﾗヴW ヮWI┌ﾉｷ;ヴ ;ﾐS ﾗ┌デゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ W┝ヮWヴｷWﾐIWゲ ﾗa aｷﾉﾏげ ふヴぶぶが H┌デ デｴW┞ ;ヴW IWﾐデヴ;ﾉ デﾗ デｴW Iｴ;ヴｪWゲ 
Topp brings against me. Focussing on my discussion of Heimat in chapter 6, Topp argues that 
although I lay claim to an approach giving due to both biology and culture, universal 
mechanisms of response do almost all of the work in the analysis. (Thomson-Jones makes a 
related complaint about this analysis, to which I turn below.) So what gives here? 
 
The example of Heimat is not quite fit for purpose. Although the seriWゲ ｷゲ ;ﾐ ｷﾐゲデ;ﾐIW ﾗa けﾉ;デW 
ﾏﾗSWヴﾐｷゲﾏがげ デｴW ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴ ゲWケ┌WﾐIW I aﾗI┌ゲ ┌ヮﾗﾐ ｷゲ ┗Wヴ┞ Iﾉ;ゲゲｷI;ﾉ ｷﾐ ｷデゲ Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾗﾐき ﾗﾐﾉ┞ デｴW 
perplexing presence of the estate agent acts anything like a stone in the shoe of the viewer. 
Tﾗヮヮげゲ IｴﾗゲWﾐ ;ﾉデWヴﾐ;デｷ┗Wが Eros + Massacre, is certainly a better fit. Nonetheless, the example 
of Heimat does serve to bring into focus a number of questions about the role of culture in film 
(and art) appreciation: how can viewers unfamiliar with the language, cultural practices, and 
socio-hｷゲデﾗヴｷI;ﾉ IﾗﾐデW┝デ ﾗa ; aｷﾉﾏ ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉ┞ ｴﾗヮW デﾗ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐS ｷデい AヴWﾐげデ ┘W デヴ;ヮヮWS ｷﾐ デｴW 
prison house, if not of our native language, then of our home culture?  
 
Topp takes me to be arguing that none of these factors constitute much an impediment, and to 
the extent that he rests his argument on my analysis of the sequence from Heimatが デｴ;デげゲ ; a;ｷヴ 
assessment. But the burden of the discussion as a whole is not to deny that culturally specific 
factors play an important role in our appreciation of films, but rather to deny that an 
understanding of culturally unfamiliar films is wholly beyond our grasp.  And this where the 
ﾐﾗデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa HｷﾗI┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏが ヴWﾃWIデｷﾐｪ ;ゲ ｷデ SﾗWゲ けゲデ;ﾐS;ヴS SｷIｴﾗデﾗﾏﾗ┌ゲ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデゲ ﾗa デｴW ｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐ 
mind th;デぐﾗヮヮﾗゲW ﾐ;デ┌ヴW デﾗ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴWが ┘ｷデｴﾗ┌デ a┌ﾉﾉ┞ Wﾉｷﾏｷﾐ;デｷﾐｪ デｴｷゲ Hｷﾐ;ヴ┞ ﾗヮヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐぐぷｷﾐゲデW;S 
envisioning] the cultural as an extension or outgrowth of the natural に ie. as an evolved capacity 
ﾗa ｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐゲ デﾗ SW┗Wﾉﾗヮ ;ﾐS ┌ゲW ｷﾐゲデヴ┌ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ｷﾐデWﾉﾉｷｪWﾐIWげ ふG;ﾉﾉWゲWが ヴぶが does its work. Our 
┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾗa I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ Sｷゲデ;ﾐデ aｷﾉﾏゲ ┘ｷﾉﾉ IWヴデ;ｷﾐﾉ┞ HW けﾉWゲゲ ヮヴWIｷゲWげ ふΒぶ デｴ;ﾐ デｴW 
understanding achieved by a cultural insider. The evidence that Fingerhut cites (4) regarding 
the difficulty novice viewers, wholly unfamiliar with mainstream filmmaking, have in grasping 
the spatial implications implied by continuity conventions, may be a good example. But such 
understanding is always a matter of degree. Of Eros + Massacreが Tﾗヮヮ ;ゲﾆゲぎ けhow can I know to 
what extent my incomplete understanding of the film is an intended effect of artistic strategies 
Iﾗﾏﾏﾗﾐ デﾗ デｴW ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴW ﾗa ﾏﾗSWヴﾐｷゲデ IｷﾐWﾏ;ぐ;ﾐS ｴﾗ┘ ﾏ┌Iｴ ｷデ SWヴｷ┗Wゲ aヴﾗﾏ ﾏ┞ 
ｷｪﾐﾗヴ;ﾐIW ﾗa ゲヮWIｷaｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ J;ヮ;ﾐWゲW I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ﾏ;デデWヴゲいげ ふΓぶ TｴW ;ﾐゲ┘Wヴ ｷゲぎ ┞ﾗ┌ I;ﾐげデぁ Nﾗデ aﾗヴ ゲ┌ヴWく 
But it is generally true that our higher-level interpretative judgements have a probabilistic 
character, whether these bear on culturally proximate or remote works. 
 
Fiction and emotion 
I ﾐﾗデWS ;Hﾗ┗W ;ﾐ ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデ ;ゲゲ┌ﾏヮデｷﾗﾐ ┌ﾐSWヴﾉ┞ｷﾐｪ G;ﾉﾉWゲWげゲ ;ヮヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ES to film 
spectatorship: that ES is relevant to film viewing because film viewing is a species of human 
social interaction more generally. This is so because when we watch narrative films, we typically 
interact with both characters depicted by them and with other audience members. But this is 
an assumption that Kate Thomson-Jones challenges. Objecting to the apparently direct and 
unqualified transfer of scientific research on emotion to the context of our appreciation of film 
art に as exemplified by my analysis of Heimat in chapter 6 に Thomson-JﾗﾐWゲ ┘ヴｷデWゲぎ けIデ ｷゲ ﾐﾗデ 
enough to cite research on emotion recognition in everyday life. For all we know, emotion 
ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ Iﾗ┌ﾉS ┘ﾗヴﾆ ケ┌ｷデW SｷaaWヴWﾐデﾉ┞ ｷﾐ デｴW IﾗﾐデW┝デ ﾗa aｷﾉﾏげ ふヵぶく Iﾐ ヴWﾉ;デWS ┗Wｷﾐが FヴｷWﾐS ﾐﾗデWゲ 
th;デ け; HｷデIｴIﾗIﾆ デｴヴｷﾉﾉWヴ SｷaaWヴゲ Sヴ;ﾏ;デｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ Hﾗデｴ aヴﾗﾏ ゲｴﾗヴデ Iﾉｷヮゲ Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌IデWS H┞ ヮゲ┞Iｴﾗﾉﾗｪｷゲデゲ 
and from everyday emotional interactions. If our aim is to understand the affective experience 
of films like these, we should not just resign ourselves to extrapolations from studies of 
ゲﾗﾏWデｴｷﾐｪ WﾉゲWげ ふヴぶく  
 
I am happy to concede that the difference(s) insisted upon by Thomson-Jones and Friend need 
to be registered, and that it may not be sufficiently apparent in the analyses of Heimat and 
Strangers how they are so registered. But the point is certainly accommodated within the larger 
theory that I present, in the following way. On the one hand, and as discussed above, there is 
my insistence に not shared by all aestheticians, as Livingston notes に that aesthetic experience 
is distinctive: it is not identical with ordinary experience. On the other hand, I argue that 
aesthetic experience depends on ordinary perception, cognition, and affect: we do not have 
special physiological organs or brain circuits or mental modules which have evolved uniquely 
for the purpose of apprehending aesthetic qualities in the arts or the natural world. And that is 
┘ｴ;デ ｷデ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS デ;ﾆW aﾗヴ けWﾏﾗデｷﾗﾐ ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ ぷデﾗへぐ┘ﾗヴﾆ ケ┌ｷデW SｷaaWヴWﾐデﾉ┞ ｷﾐ デｴW IﾗﾐデW┝デ ﾗa aｷﾉﾏくげ 
As Rainer Reisen┣Wｷﾐ ┘ヴｷデWゲ ｷﾐ ｴｷゲ IﾗﾏﾏWﾐデ;ヴ┞が けWﾏﾗデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ヴW;Iデｷﾗﾐゲ デﾗ aｷﾉﾏ ;ヴW ﾃ┌ゲデ ;ﾐﾗデｴWヴ 
ﾆｷﾐS ﾗa Wﾏﾗデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ヴW;Iデｷﾗﾐ ふｷa ヮWヴｴ;ヮゲ ; ゲヮWIｷ;ﾉ ﾆｷﾐSぶげ ふンぶく Iﾐゲﾗa;ヴ ;ゲ ┘W I;ﾉﾉ ゲ┌Iｴ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲWゲ 
けWﾏﾗデｷﾗﾐゲがげ デｴW┞ ﾏ┌ゲデが ;デ ﾉW;ゲデ H┞ ｴ┞ヮﾗデｴWゲｷゲが HW;ヴ some resemblance to ordinary emotions. 
The assumption is widespread and longstanding in philosophy as well as psychology: Gallese 
quotes Merleau-Pﾗﾐデ┞ デﾗ デｴW WaaWIデ デｴ;デ け┘W I;ﾐ ;ヮヮﾉ┞ ┘ｴ;デ ┘W ｴ;┗W ﾃ┌ゲデ ゲ;ｷS ;Hﾗ┌デ ヮWヴIWヮデｷﾗﾐ 
ｷﾐ ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉ デﾗ デｴW ヮWヴIWヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ; aｷﾉﾏげ ふヱヱぶく  
 
But what justifies this assumption, Thomson-Jones might press? A first point is that one might 
say that it is the most reasonable assumption to start with. If we find ourselves saying we were 
surprised or horrified by a film sequence, or saddened by the outcome of a fiction film, why 
would we assume that these responses bear no relationship to our ordinary responses of 
surprise, horror, and sadness? The burden of proof here is on the sceptic who thinks that this 
way of speaking of our responses to fictions is fundamentally erroneous. But a second point can 
be made: the assumption is that our emotional responses to fiction are a species of emotion in 
general, or at least bear an important relationship to our ordinary emotions, is an empirical 
one, subject to confirmation, refutation, or revision. It is most definitely not デｴW I;ゲW デｴ;デ けfor 
all we knowが Wﾏﾗデｷﾗﾐ ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ Iﾗ┌ﾉS ┘ﾗヴﾆ ケ┌ｷデW SｷaaWヴWﾐデﾉ┞ ｷﾐ デｴW IﾗﾐデW┝デ ﾗa aｷﾉﾏげ ふﾏ┞ 
emphasis), because the question is not an obscure mystery, but a tractable, empirical question 
about which we have abundant evidence. To take just one example discussed in this 
symposium: Gallese discusses the evidence demonstrating that the brain circuits active in 
experiencing, and imagining, an emotion are overlapping (10). So long as we take seriously the 
familiar physicalist idea に central to the model of triangulation presented in FACT に that 
psychological states supervene on neurophysiological states, then this is strong evidence in 
support of the assumption I favour. And as no commentator takes issue with this principle, it 
looks like this kind of evidence is secure. 
 
FヴｷWﾐS ｷゲ ;ﾉゲﾗ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐWS デｴ;デ けデｴW Iﾉ;ゲゲｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa Wﾏﾗデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲWゲ デﾗ aｷIデｷﾗﾐ ┘ｷデｴ ﾗデｴWヴ 
emotional responses is a presupposition of psychological and neuroscientific research, not a 
IﾗﾐIﾉ┌ゲｷﾗﾐげ ふヵぶく I ;ｪヴWWが H┌デ ﾗﾐIW ;ｪ;ｷﾐが ｷデ ｷゲ ; ヮヴWゲ┌ヮヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ ゲ┌HﾃWIデ デﾗ WﾏヮｷヴｷI;ﾉ Iﾗﾐaｷヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ 
or disconfirmation. It is not merely a presupposition. This is an important aspect of theory 
construction as a philosophical method, expounded in chapter 1 of FACT, and the essence of 
NW┌ヴ;デｴげゲ ｷﾏ;ｪW ﾗa デｴW ゲIｷWﾐデｷゲデ ;ﾐS デｴW ヮｴｷﾉﾗゲﾗヮｴWヴ ;Hﾗ;ヴS ; ゲｴｷヮ ;デ ゲW; ふIｴ;ヮデWヴ ヲぶぎ W┗Wヴ┞ 
aspect of a theory can be subjected to scrutiny に and in particular empirical scrutiny に but not 
all at once, lest the ship sink. “デ;IｷW ｴWヴゲWﾉa ﾐﾗデWゲ デｴ;デ Cﾗﾉｷﾐ ‘;SaﾗヴSげゲ ┘Wﾉﾉ-known arguments on 
デｴW ｷヴヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞ ;ﾐS けｷﾐIﾗｴWヴWﾐIWげ ﾗa Wﾏﾗデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲWゲ デﾗ aｷIデｷﾗﾐ SWヮWﾐSゲ ｷﾐ ヮ;ヴデ ﾗﾐ 
empirical observations (6), which by implication are subject to revision. Theory construction 
requires a continuous shuttling between making empirical assumptions, testing empirical 
assumptions, and the refinement of the logical and conceptual fabric of the theory. 
 
Friend plays up the normative dimWﾐゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa Wﾏﾗデｷﾗﾐゲが ｴﾗﾉSｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ けWﾏﾗデｷﾗﾐゲ ｷﾐ SｷaaWヴWﾐデ 
contexts are subject to different normative constraintsげ ;ﾐS デｴ;デ デｴWヴW ｷゲ ﾐﾗ けゲｷﾏヮﾉW Hｷa┌ヴI;デｷﾗﾐげ 
between emotional responses to existents and fictions (5).11 I think this is the right picture; 
once again we face a spectrum of cases ranged on a continuum rather than sorted into two 
ﾐW;デ Hﾗ┝Wゲく Iデ ﾏ;┞ ﾐﾗ ﾉﾗﾐｪWヴ HW IﾗｴWヴWﾐデ デﾗ ｴﾗヮW aﾗヴ ｪｷaデゲ aヴﾗﾏ “;ﾐデ; ﾗﾐIW ┘Wげ┗W ﾉW;ヴﾐWS ｴW 
SﾗWゲﾐげデ W┝ｷゲデが H┌デ ｷデ I;ﾐ HW ヮWヴaWIデﾉ┞ IﾗｴWヴWﾐデ デﾗ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐS ┘ｷデｴ ;ﾐ┝ｷWデ┞ デﾗ デｴW デｴought of some 
possible future event に Hﾗデｴ aﾗヴ けH;Iﾆ┘;ヴS-ﾉﾗﾗﾆｷﾐｪげ ヴW;ゲﾗﾐゲ ふ┘W ｴ;┗W ｪﾗﾗS ｪヴﾗ┌ﾐSゲ aﾗヴ デｴｷﾐﾆｷﾐｪ 
デｴ;デ ｷデ ﾏｷｪｴデ ｴ;ヮヮWﾐぶ ;ﾐS aﾗヴ けaﾗヴ┘;ヴS-ﾉﾗﾗﾆｷﾐｪがげ ゲデヴ;デWｪｷI ヴW;ゲﾗﾐゲ ふデｴW ;ﾐ┝ｷWデ┞ ﾏﾗデｷ┗;デWゲ ┌ゲ デﾗ 
take action to avoid the event). Note also that FriWﾐSげゲ ;ヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデ Hヴｷﾐｪゲ ﾗ┌デ デｴW ┘;┞ ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ 
descriptive and normative questions are inextricably bound up with に though not reducible to に 
one another in the study of emotion. At a minimum, the empirical study of normative 
phenomena is possible, and of interest to many scientists. I agree with Friend that such 
research is usually best conducted by psychologists working collaboratively with experts in the 
relevant normative domain に in the present case, aesthetics (FACT, Intro). Gallese and 
Reisenzein are models in this respect, each of them working with colleagues in the humanities. I 
return to the complex question of the relationship between naturalized aesthetics and 




Opinions on the role and value of neuroscience vary markedly across the contributors. 
Elements of the neuroscepticism that I discuss in FACT are evident in the commentaries of 
Davies, Friend, and Levinson. Davies argues that neuroscience is simply irrelevant to normative 
questions in aesthetics に those concerned with the merit, warrant, or appropriateness of our 
responses to artworks; he also expresses concern that the specific literature that I draw upon 
concerned mirror neurons is much more controversial than I allow, and that my appeal to it 
violates an epistemic norm of naturalism に that we should draw on the best available 
knowledge in a given domain. Friend, meanwhile, revives a concern that Davies has expressed 
in earlier work (and which I address in FACT, chapter 3): that neuroscience may offer us nothing 
ﾏﾗヴW デｴ;ﾐ ;ﾐ けｷﾏヮﾉWﾏWﾐデ;デｷﾗﾐ ゲデﾗヴ┞げ ;Hﾗ┌デ デｴW ﾐW┌ヴ;ﾉ ┌ﾐSWヴヮｷﾐﾐｷﾐｪ ﾗa ヮゲ┞IｴﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ I;ヮ;IｷデｷWゲ 
and processes, including aesthetic ones (Levinson expresses the same worry, 6). In his 
commentary, Davies distances himself from the strongest version of such a view, which holds 
デｴ;デ デｴW ﾗﾐﾉ┞ W┗ｷSWﾐIW ヴWﾉW┗;ﾐデ デﾗ ;WゲデｴWデｷIゲ ｷゲ デｴ;デ ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷゲ けﾏ;ﾐｷaWゲデげ ｷﾐ デｴW ;Iデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa ;ヴデｷゲデゲ 
and appreciators (a view Davies attributes to Graham McFee in relation to dance).  
 
What can be said to allay these criticisms? To begin with, Reisenzein makes the basic but 
ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデ ﾗHゲWヴ┗;デｷﾗﾐ デｴ;デ ﾐW┌ヴﾗゲIｷWﾐIW ｷゲ けゲｷﾏヮﾉ┞ ; ゲヮWIｷ;ﾉ Hヴ;ﾐS ﾗa ヮゲ┞Iｴﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ デｴ;デ ヴWﾉｷWゲ 
heavily on measurementゲ ﾗa ﾐW┌ヴ;ﾉ ;Iデｷ┗ｷデ┞ デﾗ デWゲデ ヮゲ┞IｴﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ｴ┞ヮﾗデｴWゲWゲげ ふンぶが ゲﾗ デﾗ デｴW 
extent that Davies and Friend admit the relevance of psychology to aesthetics, they cannot 
consistently deny it to neuroscience. (Of course, it is still open to them to raise questions about 
the ways or extent to which neuroscience, as a type of psychology, is relevant to aesthetics.) As 
┘Wげ┗W ゲWWﾐが デｴｷゲ ｷﾐデｷﾏ;デW ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮ ｷゲ W┗ｷSWﾐデ ｷﾐ デｴW ┘ﾗヴﾆ G;ﾉﾉWゲWが ┘ｴｷIｴ I;ﾐ HW ┌ﾐSWヴゲデﾗﾗS 
as a neuroscientific contribution to the encompassing psychological and philosophical debates 
ヴWｪ;ヴSｷﾐｪ ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ゲｷﾏ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS デｴW WﾏHﾗSｷWS ﾏｷﾐSく Iげ┗W ;ﾉゲﾗ ﾐﾗデWS デｴW ゲWﾐゲW ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ 
G;ﾉﾉWゲWげゲ E“ デｴWゲｷゲ ゲヮWIｷaｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ H┌ｷﾉSゲ ﾗﾐ ﾗﾐW ;ゲヮWIデ ﾗa B┌ﾉﾉﾗ┌ｪｴげゲ デｴWﾗヴ┞ けPゲ┞IｴｷI;ﾉ Dｷゲデ;ﾐIWげ ;ゲ 
an essential constituent of aesthetic experience. As is abundantly clear from his contribution 
ｴWヴWが ｷデげゲ ﾐﾗデ ;ゲ ｷa G;ﾉﾉWゲW ｷゲ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ｷﾐ Iﾗﾐ┗Wヴゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ┘ｷデｴ ﾗデｴWヴ ﾐW┌ヴﾗゲIｷWﾐデｷゲデゲく AﾐS ｷa ｴW ┘;ゲが ;ﾐS 
in this conversation he and his fellow neuroscientists restricted themselves to descriptions of 
brain activity with no reference to the psychological functions subtended by the brain, it would 
be a meaningless dialogue (as I argue in a passage from FACT cited by Levinson (5) , FACT, 
chapter 2, 64). But this is a fantasy. Neuroscience, or at least the neuroscience of interest here, 
ｷゲﾐげデ I┌デ ﾗaa aヴﾗﾏ ヮゲ┞Iｴﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗヴ ヮｴｷﾉﾗゲﾗヮｴ┞く Tｴ;デげゲ ┘ｴ┞ ｷデげゲ I;ﾉﾉWS cognitive neuroscience. 
 
Digging further: Stadler and Thomson-Jones both pick up on the contribution of neuroscience 
to triangulation に the model of triangulation being an attempt to formalize the mutual 
interdependence of psychology, neuroscience, and phenomenology (in the broad sense of a 
concern with our experience of the world). Acknowledging that I am no neurofundamentalist, 
Stadler aptly characterizes デヴｷ;ﾐｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ゲ ; ﾆｷﾐS ﾗa けIヴﾗゲゲ-IｴWIﾆｷﾐｪげ ;ﾏﾗﾐｪ デｴWゲW Sﾗﾏ;ｷﾐゲ ;ﾐS 
the disciplines associated with them. The quote that she draws from FACT, to the effect that 
けﾐW┌ヴ;ﾉ W┗ｷSWﾐIW ゲｴWSゲ ﾉｷｪｴデ ﾗﾐ デｴW a┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾐ┌;ﾐIWゲ ﾗa デｴW ヮｴWﾐﾗﾏWﾐ; デｴ;デ Wﾉ┌SW ﾗヴSｷﾐ;ヴ┞ 
expWヴｷWﾐIW ;ﾐS ヴWaﾉWIデｷﾗﾐげ ふンが FACTが ヱヰンぶが ｷゲ デｴW ;ﾐゲ┘Wヴ デｴ;デ I ﾗaaWヴ デｴWヴW デﾗ デｴW 
けｷﾏヮﾉWﾏWﾐデ;デｷﾗﾐげ ﾗHﾃWIデｷﾗﾐく “ﾗ ﾉﾗﾐｪ ;ゲ ┘W ;ヴW IﾗヴヴWIデ ｷﾐ ;ゲゲ┌ﾏｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ ﾗ┌ヴ Iﾗｪﾐｷデｷ┗W 
architecture is shaped by our neural architecture, we certainly cannot rule out learning things 
about the mind via its neural realization. Iﾐ ヮヴｷﾐIｷヮﾉWが ;デ ﾉW;ゲデが デｴｷゲ ｷゲ ゲﾗﾏWデｴｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ けﾏﾗSWヴ;デW 
ﾗヮデｷﾏｷゲデゲげ ﾉｷﾆW ﾏWが ;ﾐS けﾏﾗSWヴ;デW ヮWゲゲｷﾏｷゲデゲげ ﾉｷﾆW D;┗ｷWゲが I;ﾐ ;ｪヴWW ┌ヮﾗﾐ ふD;┗ｷWゲが ヴぶく Tｴﾗﾏゲﾗﾐ-
Jones similarly recognizes the value of neuroscience as a component of triangulation, endorsing 
the neuroscientific experiment I propose as a way of resolving (or at least advancing debate on) 
the problem of anomalous suspense (4). But Davies might contend that this problem is 
descriptive rather normative, for the questions driving the debate are: what is suspense? Are 
cases of anomalous suspense genuine cases of suspense or, so to speak, false friends? More 
then needs to be said in relation to the challenge of the normative posed by Davies: can the 
empirical discipline of neuroscience scratch the normative itch of aesthetics? I return to this 
question below. 
 
Naturalism - a work in progress 
After offering a lucid and concise characterization of my naturalized approach to film, Rainer 
‘WｷゲWﾐ┣Wｷﾐ ﾐﾗデWゲ ﾏ┞ ヴWﾉｷ;ﾐIW ﾗﾐ ;ﾐ けW┝デWﾐSWS ┗Wヴゲｷﾗﾐげ ﾗa デｴW H;ゲｷI Wﾏﾗデｷﾗﾐ デｴWﾗヴ┞ ふBETぶ 
associated with psychologists such as Ekman, Ellsworth, Frijda, LeDoux, and Scherer. Noting 
デｴ;デ デｴW ﾏ;ｷﾐ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌Wﾐデゲ ﾗa デｴｷゲ デｴWﾗヴ┞ ;ヴW ﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐデ ﾗa ﾗﾐW ;ﾐﾗデｴWヴ ;ﾐS けI;ﾐ 
デｴWヴWaﾗヴW HW ｴWﾉS ゲWヮ;ヴ;デWﾉ┞ ﾗヴ ｷﾐ SｷaaWヴWﾐデ IﾗﾏHｷﾐ;デｷﾗﾐゲげ ふヵぶが ‘WｷゲWﾐ┣Wｷﾐ ｪﾗWゲ ﾗﾐ デﾗ ﾗaaWヴ ; 
three-pronged critique of BET, raising questions about the robustness of evidence supporting 
ﾐﾗﾐIﾗｪﾐｷデｷ┗W ヮ;デｴ┘;┞ゲ デﾗ Wﾏﾗデｷﾗﾐが デｴW a;Iｷ;ﾉ aWWSH;Iﾆ ｴ┞ヮﾗデｴWゲｷゲが ;ﾐS Eﾆﾏ;ﾐげゲ H;ゲｷI Wﾏﾗデｷﾗﾐ 
theory (the core of the extended version of BET). I wholeheartedly welcome ‘WｷゲWﾐ┣Wｷﾐげゲ IヴｷデｷI;ﾉ 
feedback on BET here (as I Sﾗ D;┗ｷWゲげ ﾗﾐ ﾏｷヴヴﾗヴ ﾐW┌ヴﾗﾐ ヴWゲW;ヴIｴが デﾗ ┘ｴｷIｴ Iげﾉﾉ ヴWデ┌ヴﾐぶく Wｴ;デW┗Wヴ 
the exact substance of his criticisms, and wherever this leaves us in terms of theorizing 
emotions, ‘WｷゲWﾐ┣Wｷﾐげゲ IヴｷデｷIｷゲﾏゲ W┝Wﾏヮﾉｷa┞ ; IWﾐデヴ;ﾉ ヮﾉ;ﾐﾆ ﾗa デｴW ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉｷゲデｷI ﾏWデｴﾗSぎ ┗;ヴｷﾗ┌s 
empirical components of the orthodox theory are subjected to testing, and some found in need 
of revision or elimination. Naturalistic philosophy, like the sciences with which it allies itself, is 
always a work in progress.12 
 
Also notable here is the fact that this overview of empirical research raising doubts about the 
adequacy of BET, along with a number of specific investigations contributing to this effort, are 
led by a psychologist of emotion に Reisenzein に H┌デ ﾗﾐW ┘ｴﾗが ;ゲ ┘Wげ┗W ゲWWﾐが ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷ┣Wゲ デｴW 
potential distinctiveness of emotions in different domains of experience. ‘WｷゲWﾐ┣Wｷﾐげゲ Waaﾗヴデゲが 
like those of Gallese, represent the kind of collaborative dialogue between scientists and 
humanists that I advocate in FACT. I imagine that every one of my commentators is on board 
┘ｷデｴ デｴｷゲ けデｴｷヴS I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉげ ヴWゲW;ヴIｴ ヮヴﾗｪヴ;ﾏﾏWく FヴｷWﾐSが ｴﾗ┘W┗Wヴが ヴ;ｷゲWゲ ゲﾗﾏW ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐゲ ;Hﾗ┌デ 
the fine detail of my position. She worries that the division of labour I posit between 
philosophers and scientists is too stark に けHﾗデｴ ┌ﾐヴW;ﾉｷゲデｷI ;ﾐS ┌ﾐSWゲｷヴ;HﾉWげ ふンぶ に and that a 
consequence of my focus on the implications of various bodies of scientific research for the 
ｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐｷデｷWゲ ｷゲ ; けヴｴWデﾗヴｷI;ﾉ Sｷﾏｷﾐ┌デｷﾗﾐげ ふヲぶ ﾗa デｴW IﾗﾐデヴｷH┌デｷﾗﾐ デｴ;デ デｴWﾗヴｷゲデゲ ｷﾐ デｴW ;ヴデゲ ;ﾐS 
humanities might make to the third culture.  
 
While I certainly accept that FACT has this emphasis, I do think that it is a matter of rhetoric 
ふ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷゲ ﾐﾗデ デﾗ ゲ;┞ デｴ;デ ｷデ SﾗWゲﾐげデ ﾏ;デデWヴぶく TｴW Hﾗﾗﾆ ｪｷ┗Wゲ ; ﾉﾗデ ﾗa ゲヮ;IW デﾗ ヮゲ┞IｴﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉが 
neuroscientific, and evolutionary findings, but all of this material is filtered through the 
sensibility of a philosopher and film scholar に mine! In this sense, the traffic is rather less 
unidirectional than Friend suggests; indeed Reisenzein notes the value of naturalized aesthetics 
a la FACT to psychologists, as a venue for the testing and refinement of psychological theories 
ﾗa Wﾏﾗデｷﾗﾐ ふヵぶが ;ﾐS ;ゲ ; ゲヮWIｷWゲ ﾗa けデｴWﾗヴWデｷI;ﾉ ヮゲ┞Iｴﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ふぶく I ;ﾏ ;ﾉゲﾗ ﾗﾐ Hﾗ;ヴS ┘ｷデｴ FヴｷWﾐSげゲ 
campaign to   SW┗Wﾉﾗヮ けW┝ヮWヴｷﾏWﾐデゲ デｴ;デ ;ヴW ﾏﾗヴW ﾉｷﾆWﾉ┞ デﾗ ゲｴWS ﾉｷｪｴデ ﾗﾐ ヮｴｷﾉﾗゲﾗヮｴｷI;ﾉ ｷゲゲ┌Wゲげ 
(5). As Thomson-Jones notes (4), this is precisely the goal of the neuroscientific experiment I 
propose in chapter 2 as a means of advancing debate on suspense. 
 
Moreover, the description of the division of labour that I describe and endorse, targeted by 
Friend, is intended as an idealized model of the way collaborative research is conducted. In 
actual practice, this is inevitably going to be a lot messier. The roles I allocate to the 
philosopher-theorist on the one hand, and the empirical researcher on the other hand, are 
exactly that: roles. These roles might be filled by a few or a great many people, depending on 
the scope of the project, but in any event the key point is that sometimes the philosopher will 
get her hands dirty in the lab or the field, while the scientist will sometimes settle back into the 
armchair. So long as the distinct roles and tasks in the process of generating knowledge are 
a┌ﾉふaｷﾉﾉWSぶが ｷデ SﾗWゲﾐげデ ﾏ;デデWヴ ｷﾐ ヮヴｷﾐIｷヮﾉW デﾗ ┘ｴｷIｴ SWヮ;ヴデﾏWﾐデ ﾗヴ a;I┌ﾉデ┞ デｴe investigators belong. 
(It might matter in terms of funding, of course.) Indeed, an absolute division of labour, strictly 
allocating the distinct roles to separate individuals, would likely have the effect of entrenching 
デｴW デヴ;Sｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ けデ┘ﾗ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴWゲくげ 
 
RWｷゲWﾐ┣Wｷﾐげゲ IヴｷデｷI;ﾉ W┝;ﾏｷﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa BET ﾉW;Sゲ ┌ゲ H;Iﾆ デﾗ the relationship between ordinary 
emotions, and emotions in the context of art and film appreciation. Reisenzein and I share the 
┗ｷW┘ デｴ;デ けaｷIデｷﾗﾐ Wﾏﾗデｷﾗﾐゲげ ;ヴW ; ゲヮWIｷWゲ ﾗa Wﾏﾗデｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉく B┌デ recognition of this fact, 
;ﾉﾗﾐｪ ┘ｷデｴ FヴｷWﾐSげゲ ヴWﾉ;デWS ┗ｷW┘ デｴ;デ デｴW W┝;Iデ S┞ﾐ;ﾏｷIゲ ﾗa Wﾏﾗデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ HWｴ;┗ｷﾗ┌ヴ ┘ｷﾉﾉ ┗;ヴ┞ 
across different contexts, leads to a nice twist: BET may be misleading or flat-out wrong as an 
overall theory of ordinary emotions, while remaining illuminating in relation to emotions in the 
context of fiction films. How does the circle get squared? The hypothesis here is that, while it 
may be correct that facial expression of emotion is considerably less significant than BET implies 
for emotions in general, that theory might retain centrality as an account of the way emotions 
are represented in films. The grounds for this hypothesis are that the distinctive communicative 
conditions of filmic representation lead filmmakers to employ legible representations of 
emotion as a core tactic. As Stadler makes clear in her commentary, in chapter 6 of FACT I argue 
that real-world emotional expressions are shaped and sculpted in films according to the 
purposes of filmmakers, and these vary across individuals, traditions, and periods. But orthodox 
narrative films, at least, place a premium on the dramatic clarity. As David Bordwell has 
demonstrated, real-world behaviours in general are typically streamlined in films, and 
sometimes substantially transformed. All of this shows, I hope, sensitivity to point urged by 
Thomson-Jones and Friend: recognition of the particularity of emotion in the specialized 
contexts of art.  
 
A related methodological observation is also worth making here: while Reisenzein cites a 
(single) quantitative study of the prevalence of legible emotional expressions in film which casts 
about on the assumption of their ubiquity, echoing the challenge to BET in the context of real-
world emotional behaviour, one wonders if a qualitative approach to this question might reach 
a different conclusion. In effect, chapters 6 and 7 of FACT constitute just such a study and 
conclusion. What is to be done? In the spirit of the third culture: more research on the 
particular case of film, conducted collaboratively by psychologists and film specialists, drawing 
on both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, combined with an effort to see how all of 
デｴｷゲが ｷﾐ デｴW ┘ﾗヴSゲ ﾗa WｷﾉaヴｷS “Wﾉﾉ;ヴゲが けｴ;ﾐｪゲ デﾗｪWデｴWヴげ ふケ┌ﾗデWS ｷﾐ FACTが ヲヱが ヲヴぶく 
 
 
Naturalism and normativity 
 
けV;ﾉ┌Wゲ Sﾗ ﾐﾗデ ﾃ┌ゲデ Sヴﾗヮ aヴﾗﾏ ﾗﾐ ｴｷｪｴがげ ┘ヴｷデWゲ FヴｷWﾐSが けﾉｷﾆW ; ヮ;ｷヴ ﾗa ゲデﾗﾐW デ;HﾉWデゲ aヴﾗﾏ ; 
ﾏﾗ┌ﾐデ;ｷﾐげ ふヵぶく Wｴ;デ ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉｷゲデ ┘ｷﾉﾉ Sｷゲ;ｪヴWWい AﾐS ┞Wデ ┗;ﾉ┌Wゲ ;ﾐS ゲデ;ﾐS;ヴSゲ に epistemic, ethical, 
aesthetic に suffuse and shape human actions and practices. FACT insists that the discipline of 
aesthetics Is not exhausted by normative questions, and that there are many explanatory 
questions about what is the case that we can fruitfully address without being drawn into what 
ought (by some standard) to be the case. B┌デ デｴWヴWげゲ ﾐﾗ SWﾐ┞ｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ ﾐﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗W ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐゲ 
occupy an important position in aesthetics に works are judged to be good or bad, 
interpretations more or less correct or adequate, acts of appreciation more or less appropriate. 
So in the long run, naturalized aesthetics will need to say something normativity. 
 
WWげ┗W ゲWWﾐ FヴｷWﾐSげゲ ﾗ┘ﾐ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲW デﾗ デｴｷゲ ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏぎ ;ﾐ ｷﾐゲｷゲデWﾐIW ┌ヮﾗﾐ デｴW ﾐﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗W 
constraints governing emotional responses, constraints which vary across real, imagined, and 
fictional contexts. In the study of emotion, at least, it is not possible to entirely disentangle 
from the descriptive and the normative. FACT takes a broadly similar line (even if it does not 
;ﾉ┘;┞ゲ ゲ;デｷゲa┞ FヴｷWﾐSぶが ┘ｴｷIｴ Iげﾉﾉ ;デデWﾏヮデ デﾗ Wﾉ;Hﾗヴ;デW ﾗﾐ ｴWヴWが WゲヮWIｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾐ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲW to Laura di 
“┌ﾏﾏ;げゲ IﾗﾏﾏWﾐデ;ヴ┞が ┘ｴｷIｴ aﾗI┌ゲWゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮ HWデ┘WWﾐ ﾐ;デ┌ralism and criticism. But 
before doing so, I want to acknowledge another stance on value which is often obscured in 
naturalistically-ﾗヴｷWﾐデWS SWH;デWゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW デﾗヮｷIく V;ﾉ┌Wゲ Sﾗﾐげデ Sescend from mountain tops, for 
ゲ┌ヴWき H┌デ ﾏ;┞HW デｴW┞ Sﾗﾐげデ ﾐWWS デﾗく PWヴｴ;ヮゲ デｴW┞ ;ヴW ﾃ┌ゲデ けデｴWヴWげ ｷﾐ デｴW aｷヴゲデ ヮﾉ;IWく PWヴｴ;ヮゲ デｴW┞ 
are simply part of the structure of the universe, in the same way that numerical truths exist 
irrespective of there being material particulars to instantiate them (or that matter, conscious 
agents to notice them). Different species have evolved to grasp numerical realities to different 
SWｪヴWWゲが ;ﾐS デｴW けW┝デWﾐSWS ﾐ┌ﾏWヴ;I┞げ ﾗa デｴW ｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐ ゲヮWIｷWゲ に the mathematical dimension of 
the extended mind に is central to its nature and success as a species. Perhaps beauty and 
goodness are like numbers: they are part of the fabric of the universe, and smart creatures can 
SW┗Wﾉﾗヮ ; I;ヮ;Iｷデ┞ デﾗ ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷ┣W デｴWﾏく B┌デ デｴWﾐが ;ヴWﾐげデ ゲ┌Iｴ ┗;ﾉ┌Wゲ デｴW┞ ﾃ┌ゲt another variety of 
fact? And as such, they fall within the ambit of naturalism?13 
 
The challenge of normativity to naturalism is discussed by Davies and Friend, but it is Laura di 
Summa who confronts it most directly. While Davies argues that neuroscience I;ﾐげデ デWﾉﾉ ┌ゲ 
whether a given response to an artwork is merited or appropriate, but only what kind of a 
response it is, di Summa to the contrary argues that naturalism can shed light on the 
けaｷデデｷﾐｪﾐWゲゲげ ﾗa ﾗ┌ヴ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲWゲく PWヴｴ;ヮゲ デｴW ｪ;ヮ HWデ┘WWﾐ デｴWゲW デ┘ﾗ perspectives is not as large 
;ゲ ｷデ ;ヮヮW;ヴゲが デｴﾗ┌ｪｴが ｷa ┘W デ;ﾆW ｷﾐデﾗ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデ デｴ;デ D;┗ｷWゲげ ;ヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデ ｷゲ ゲヮWIｷaｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ デ;ヴｪWデWS ;デ 
neuroscience, while di Summa has in mind the overall theory of naturalized aesthetics that I 
present (which, as I stress in the l;ゲデ ﾉｷﾐWゲ ﾗa Iｴ;ヮデWヴ ヱが ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS ﾐﾗデ HW デｴﾗ┌ｪｴデ ﾗa ゲｷﾏヮﾉ┞ ;ゲ けデｴW 
ゲIｷWﾐIW ﾗa ;WゲデｴWデｷIゲげぶく Tｴｷゲ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ;ﾉｷｪﾐ ｴWヴ ﾏﾗヴW IﾉﾗゲWﾉ┞ ┘ｷデｴ FヴｷWﾐSげゲ ヴWﾏ;ヴﾆゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW 
normative dimension of emotions which, as we have seen, Friend does believe can be tackled 
via the collaboration of psychologists and philosophers.  
 
Even so, di Summa wants to push the normative boat out much further. She does this by 
exploring the potential contribution of naturalized aesthetics to criticism に by which I take it she 
means the evaluative interpretation and assessment of particular works (or groups of works). 
She does this against the backdrop of the marked scepticism I express on this topic in FACT, 
where I argue that けデｴWヴW ｷゲ ; ┗Wヴ┞ ﾏ;ヴﾆWS Iﾗﾐデヴ;ゲデ HWデ┘WWﾐ IヴｷデｷIｷゲﾏ ;ﾐS デｴWﾗヴ┞げ ふヵンぶく 
Nonetheless the third of her three suggestions, concerning the role of naturalism in illuminating 
the character and value of the individual work, does echo a line of thought in FACT, where I 
propose that け; ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉｷ┣WS ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ デﾗ ;WゲデｴWデｷIゲ I;ﾐ ｴWﾉヮ ┌ゲ ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷze the singular character 
of works of art, by showing how they emerge from に the and stand out in relief against に a 
H;Iﾆｪヴﾗ┌ﾐS ﾗa ヮ;デデWヴﾐゲ ;ﾐS ヴWｪ┌ﾉ;ヴｷデｷWゲげ ふヵヵぶく Tｴｷゲ ｷゲ WゲヮWIｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ ゲ;ﾉｷWﾐデ ｷﾐ Iｴ;ヮデWヴ Βが ┘ｴWヴW デｴW 
focus is on the way individual films can give expression to unique emotional blends, like the mix 
ﾗa けW┝┌HWヴ;ﾐデ ﾏWﾉ;ﾐIｴﾗﾉ┞げ AくOく “Iﾗデデ aｷﾐSゲ ｷﾐ ﾏ;ﾐ┞ ﾗa PWSヴﾗ AﾉﾏﾗSﾙ┗;ヴげゲ aｷﾉﾏゲ, including Los 
abrazos rotos (2009). Levinson furnishes two further striking examples, in the expression of an 
alien sensｷHｷﾉｷデ┞ ｷﾐ Jﾗﾐ;デｴ;ﾐ Gﾉ;┣Wヴげゲ Under the Skin ふヲヰヱンぶが ;ﾐS ﾗa ; ゲデ;デW ;デ ﾗﾐIW けﾗa ┌デデWヴ 
a;ゲIｷﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ┌デデWヴ HﾗヴWSﾗﾏげ ｷﾐ Béla T;ヴヴげゲ Turin Horse (2011) (8-9). The strange emotional 
brews found in these films stand in contrast to the more familiar emotions at play in the 
sequence from Heimat explored in chapter 6, but we get a better grip on both by setting them 
in the context of the general theory of emotion set out by FACT. That, at least, is the claim. 
 
Di “┌ﾏﾏ; ;ﾉゲﾗ ヮヴﾗヮﾗゲWゲ デｴ;デ け; IﾉﾗゲW ;ﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲ ﾗa ぷデｴWへ Wﾏヮ;デｴｷI ;ﾐS ゲ┞ﾏヮ;デｴWデｷI ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲWゲ 
ぷWﾉｷIｷデWS H┞ aｷﾉﾏゲへぐI;ﾐ ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ ;ﾐ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾗa デｴW ┘;┞ゲ ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ ┗;ﾉ┌W ﾃ┌SｪWﾏWﾐデゲ ﾏ;┞ HW 
ｷﾏヮﾉｷWS H┞ ゲ┌Iｴ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲWゲげ ふンぶき Sｷ “┌ﾏﾏ; ｴ;ゲ ｷﾐ ﾏｷﾐS ﾏﾗヴ;ﾉ ┗;ﾉ┌Wゲ ふヶぶが H┌デ ヮresumably 
aesthetic values might also be in play here (the power or beauty or delicacy of a work might 
arise from its weave of sympathy and empathy). I think di Summa is onto something here. Her 
position might be related to that of Jenefer Robinson, who holds that an emotionally-attuned 
ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲW デﾗ ; ┘ﾗヴﾆが a;ヴ aヴﾗﾏ HWｷﾐｪ ゲ┞ﾏヮデﾗﾏ;デｷI ﾗa ;ﾐ け;aaWIデｷ┗W a;ﾉﾉ;I┞がげ ｷゲ WゲゲWﾐデｷ;ﾉ デﾗ ｷデゲ 
proper ;ヮヮヴWIｷ;デｷﾗﾐ ふデｴW ﾐﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗W ;デ ┘ﾗヴﾆ ;ｪ;ｷﾐぶく Dｷ “┌ﾏﾏ;げゲ ヮヴﾗヮﾗゲ;ﾉ WaaWIデｷ┗Wﾉ┞ aﾗI┌ゲWゲ ﾗﾐ 
the other side of this coin: if an emotional response is necessary for a correct appreciation, then 
there must be an affective structure に the structure of sympathy and empathy に which is the 
object of the response. By teasing out the character of that structure に as I do in relation to 
HitcｴIﾗIﾆげゲ Saboteur and Strangers, among other examples に we can get clearer on both the 
implied moral stance of a work, as well as the degree to which it adheres to or departs from 
generic patterns of sympathy, antipathy, empathy, and counterempathy. 
 
This point about the importance of our emotional responses to characters as a ground of the 
moral and/or aesthetic value of a work provides an answer to another question posed by 
Thomson-JﾗﾐWゲぎ け┘ｴ┞ ぷｷゲへ ┗ｷW┘Wヴゲげ ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴゲげ Wﾏﾗデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐ ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデ ヮart of their 
understanding and experience of a film as artいげ ふヵぶく ‘WIﾗｪﾐｷ┣ｷﾐｪ デｴW ;aaWIデｷ┗W ゲデ;デWゲ ﾗa 
characters に the focus of the Heimat sequence analysis which prompts Thomson-Jones to ask 
this question に is, generally speaking, a prerequisite to responses of sympathy and empathy; 
only in the case of low-level emotional contagion might it be said that we can respond with 
some sort of fellow feeling to a character without conscious recognition of their state. If the 
play of sympathy and empathy with characters is integral to the value we attach to works of 
narrative film art, then recognition of the emotions of these characters is indeed a necessary 
part of our proper appreciation of them. One might also legitimately ask: on what view would 
this not be the case? Only an extreme formalism, of the type articulated by Clive Bell, in which 
the representational content of a work is at best incidental to its aesthetic value, would seem 
able to make our recognition of characters and their states of mind so marginal.  
 
Di Summa concludes by articulating two broad objections to her own proposals: first, that 
critical interpretations and evaluations may change over time, and thus may lack the stability 
necessary for a systematic, naturalistic analysis; and second, that naturalism is somehow 
restricted to a focus on the aesthetic experience arising from direct engagement with a work, 
ﾐWｪﾉWIデｷﾐｪ デｴW けヴWaﾉWIデｷ┗W ;aデWヴﾉｷaWげ ﾗa デｴW ┘ﾗヴﾆが ｷﾐ PWデWヴ Kｷ┗┞げゲ W┗ﾗI;デｷ┗W ヮｴヴ;ゲW ふヱヱぶく Oﾐ デｴW aｷヴゲデ 
point: it is certainly true that the variability of interpretations and value judgements across 
individuals and audiences makes life complicated for anyone looking to come up with a theory 
of such judgements. But variability is everywhere, in our biology as much as our psychology, 
;ﾐS ;ゲ ゲ┌Iｴ SﾗWゲﾐげデ ヮ┌デ ｷﾐデWヴヮヴWデ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗヴ W┗;ﾉ┌;デｷﾗﾐ HW┞ﾗﾐS デｴW ヴW;Iｴ ﾗa ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏく IﾐSWWS 
chapter 1 of FACT sketches out a naturalistic account of anti-intentionalist acts of interpretation 
(of the type that di Summa sees as a threat to naturalistically-informed criticism, 9). As for the 
second objection voiced by di Summa: chapter 7 of FACT in fact presses home a very similar 
point to the one made by Kivy, specifically ｷﾐ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ デﾗ Wﾏヮ;デｴ┞く WW ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉSﾐげデ デｴｷﾐﾆ ﾗa ﾗ┌ヴ 
empathic responses as being limited to the duration of our direct engagement with a film, since 
we may find ourselves simulating in imagination the experiences of characters retrospectively, 
long after the light on the screen has ceased to flicker (FACT, 196-7). 
 
We cannot leave the topic of the normative dimension of aesthetics without returning to the 
questions raised by Davies about the (ir)relevance of neuroscience に and by implication, any 
strictly empirical enquiry に to this dimension. Neuroscientists might discover that the 
expressive qualities we attribute to music might vary notably depending on whether we are 
け;┌Sｷﾗ-┗ｷW┘ｷﾐｪげ ; ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;ﾐIW ﾗa ; ﾏ┌ゲｷI;ﾉ Iﾗﾏヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐが ﾗヴ ﾉｷゲデWﾐｷﾐｪ デﾗ ｷデき H┌デが ゲ;┞ゲ D;┗ｷes, that 
┘ﾗﾐげデ ﾏ;ﾆW ; ﾃﾗデ ﾗa SｷaaWヴWﾐIW デﾗ デｴW ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW IﾗヴヴWIデ IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa ﾏ┌ゲｷI;ﾉ ;ヮヮヴWIｷ;デｷﾗﾐ 
(which are presumably, on a traditional classical vision at least, narrowly aural). Similarly for the 
case of dance: the fact that (there is neural evidence that) dancers and other experts in dance 
ヴWゲヮﾗﾐS ﾐﾗデ;Hﾉ┞ SｷaaWヴWﾐデﾉ┞ デﾗ S;ﾐIW ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;ﾐIWゲ デｴ;ﾐ ﾉ;┞ ┗ｷW┘Wヴゲ SﾗWゲﾐげデ ;aaWIデ ;デ ;ﾉﾉ デｴW 
correct norms of dance appreciation. Those norms, Davies argues, are set by the practices of 
artists themselves, and it is up to critics and philosophers alike to recover and reconstruct them 
ｷﾐ W┝ヮﾉﾗヴｷﾐｪ デｴWゲW ヮヴ;IデｷIWゲく ふIデげゲ ┘ﾗヴデｴ ﾐﾗデｷﾐｪ ｴWヴW デｴ;デ ゲ┌Iｴ ヴWIﾗ┗Wヴ┞ ﾗa デｴW ふﾗaデWﾐ デ;Iｷデぶ 
norms of artistic practices is itself a largely empirical activity, though admittedly one that 
ﾗヮWヴ;デWゲ ;デ デｴW けﾏ;ﾐｷaWゲデげ ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ けゲ┌HヮWヴゲﾗﾐ;ﾉげ ﾉW┗Wﾉくぶ  
 
But is it right to say that these empirical discoveries simply leave our norms intact, in all cases? 
That such discoveries necessarily ｴ;┗W ﾐﾗ HW;ヴｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ ﾐﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗W ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐゲい LWデげゲ ヴWvisit the case 
ﾗa W┝ヮヴWゲゲｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ ﾏ┌ゲｷIぐ  
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1 Forthcoming in Estetika 1/2019 LVI (New Series: XII). 
2 JWヴヴﾗﾉS LW┗ｷﾐゲﾗﾐげゲ ヮﾗWデｷI;ﾉﾉ┞-licensed acronym for Film, Art, and the Third Culture, introduced 
at the outset of his commentary (1). 
                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                           
3 G;ﾉﾉWゲWげゲ E“ デｴWﾗヴ┞ ;ﾉゲﾗ ﾏ;ﾆWゲ ;ﾐ ;ヮヮW;ヴ;ﾐIW ｴWヴW ｷﾐ J;ﾐW “デ;SﾉWヴげゲ IﾗﾏﾏWﾐデ;ヴ┞ (10), where 
she relates it to kindred research, including that of Mark Johnson; David Davies strikes a more 
critical note on the embodied simulation/mirror neuron research programme in his 
contribution (10-12). 
4 NﾗデW デｴ;デ デｴW ﾐﾗデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa けデヴ;ﾐゲヮ;ヴWﾐI┞げ SWaWﾐSWS H┞ Wｷﾉゲﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ;デ ゲデ;ﾆW ｴWヴW ｷゲ not the same 
;ゲ デｴW ┗Wヴゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa けデヴ;ﾐゲヮ;ヴWﾐI┞げ SWaWﾐSWS H┞ KWﾐS;ﾉﾉ W;ﾉデﾗﾐ ;ゲ ; ヮヴﾗヮWヴデ┞ ﾗa ヮｴﾗデﾗｪヴ;ヮｴゲが 
;ヮヮW;ヴ;ﾐIWゲ ﾐﾗデ┘ｷデｴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪく W;ﾉデﾗﾐげゲ デｴWﾗヴ┞ ﾗa ヮｴﾗデﾗｪヴ;ヮｴ┞ ｷゲ SｷゲI┌ゲゲWS in chapter 1 and 
the Conclusion of FACT. 
5 B┌ﾉﾉﾗ┌ｪｴ ふヱΓヱヲぶく B┌ﾉﾉﾗ┌ｪｴげゲ ｷﾐaﾉ┌Wﾐデｷ;ﾉ Wゲゲ;┞ ｷゲ ;ﾐﾗデｴWヴ ヴWﾏｷﾐSWヴ ﾗa デｴW ﾉﾗﾐｪ ｴｷゲデﾗヴ┞ ﾗa 
naturalistic approaches to the aesthetic discussed in FACT (chapter 1, xx-xx). 
6 Sherri Irvin (2014) has proposed an account along these lines.  
7 I argue for the symmetry between aesthetic value and disvalue in my review (Smith 2018) of 
Jerrold Levinson, Aesthetic Pursuits (2016). 
8 On this point, see Raffman (1993), xx-xx. 
9 Hanich (2017). 
10 Noë (2015); see also the useful review by Hyman (2017). 
11 On this point, see the discussion in my interview with Angelo Cioffi (2018). 
12 FｷﾐｪWヴｴ┌デ デﾗﾗ ヴWﾏ;ヴﾆゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW けヴW┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ I;ヮ;Iｷデ┞げ ﾗa ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ふヱヱぶが デｴﾗ┌ｪｴ ｷデげゲ ┌ﾐIﾉW;ヴ デﾗ 
ﾏW ┘ｴ┞ デｴW ;Sﾗヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ヴWゲW;ヴIｴ ﾗﾐ けﾏﾗデﾗヴ Wﾏヮ;デｴ┞ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW I;ﾏWヴ;げ に or any other specific 
body of empirical knowledge に would increase this capacity. 
 
